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Abstract
In his general theory of relativity (GR) Einstein sought to generalize the special-
relativistic equivalence of inertial frames to a principle according to which all frames
of reference are equivalent. He claimed to have achieved this aim through the general
covariance of the equations of GR. There is broad consensus among philosophers
of relativity that Einstein was mistaken in this. That equations can be made to
look the same in different frames certainly does not imply in general that such
frames are physically equivalent. We shall argue, however, that Einstein’s position
is tenable. The equivalence of arbitrary frames in GR should not be equated with
relativity of arbitrary motion, though. There certainly are observable differences
between reference frames in GR (differences in the way particles move and fields
evolve). The core of our defense of Einstein’s position will be to argue that such
differences should be seen as fact-like rather than law-like in GR. By contrast, in
classical mechanics and in special relativity (SR) the differences between inertial
systems and accelerated systems have a law-like status. The fact-like character of
the differences between frames in GR justifies regarding them as equivalent in the
same sense as inertial frames in SR.
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1 The meaning of equivalence
In a striking passage of the Second Day of the Dialogue Concerning the Two
Chief World Systems, Galileo (1953, p. 187) lets Salviati describe what hap-
pens in the cabin of a moving ship:
“The fish in their water will swim toward the front of their bowl with no
more effort than toward the back . . . the butterflies and flies will continue
their flights indifferently toward every side . . . And if smoke is made by
burning some incense, it will be seen going up in the form of a little cloud,
remaining still and moving no more toward one side than to the other. The
cause of all these correspondences of effects is the fact that the ship’s motion
is common to all the things contained in it, and to the air also.”
Everything happens as if the ship were not moving at all. Galileo is anticipat-
ing 1 the relativity principle of classical mechanics here: mechanical processes
take place in the same way in all inertial frames of reference. 2 This is to be
contrasted with what happens in accelerated frames. Because of the inertial
forces that we experience in such frames we can distinguish them immediately
from uniformly moving frames. Accordingly, it is duely stressed by Galileo
that the water on which the ship is sailing should be calm, and the ship’s
motion tranquil.
The equivalence of inertial frames in classical mechanics was extended to non-
mechanical processes by Einstein and became one of the two basic postulates
of special relativity theory (SR). In his general relativity theory (GR) Einstein
set out to generalize this principle to arbitrary frames of reference. There seems
to be a consensus among philosophers of physics that he failed—a verdict that
we shall try to reverse in this paper. But let us have a closer look at Galileo’s
discussion of the equivalence of frames before considering these modern devel-
opments.
Suppose we open the windows of Galileo’s cabin: the air in the cabin will
in general no longer move along with the ship (as noticed by Salvati a little
further on in the Dialogue). We shall feel a breeze, whose force will depend
on the ship’s speed (on a windless day). Smoke will not rise vertically to the
ceiling anymore, but will go with the wind. So we now can tell that the ship
is moving. What happened to the equivalence of frames when we opened the
windows?
1 Galileo’s principle is about motion along the spherical surface of the Earth though,
unlike the Cartesian/Newtonian principle incorporated into classical mechanics.
2 The exact sense in which this ‘sameness’ has to be understood will be the subject
of extensive discussion below.
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The accepted reply, within the framework of classical mechanics, is that the
principle according to which all inertial frames are equivalent faces no problem
at all in the new situation. This is because the principle only states that the
mechanical laws are the same in all inertial frames of reference; factual states
of affairs may and will be different. I myself, for example, am in rest only in my
own rest frame. That does not imply any conflict with the relativity principle.
Similarly, the air may be at rest in the rest frame of the shores of Galileo’s
lake, and not at rest with respect to the ship, without repercussions for the
equivalence of these frames. What counts is only whether the same mechanical
laws apply in the two frames. And they do: Both in the ship frame and the
lake frame, smoke is carried along by the motion of the air and butterflies fly
in the air surrounding them according to the same mechanical principles.
Imagine that two crew members play a game of table-tennis in the ship’s
cabin. Depending on whether the windows are open or not, they will have to
adjust their playing tactics; especially so if the wind is changeable. Obviously,
the situations with and without wind are observationally distinguishable. But
this does not entail that the frames are inequivalent in the two cases. It is not
the contingent circumstance whether or not the air is moving that matters,
but rather whether the motion of the ball, the motion of the air, and all
other processes can be subsumed under the same general laws. The latter is
the case. The differences in wind velocity correspond to different values of
the parameters that specify the initial and boundary conditions, but not to
differences in the applicable laws of nature.
So, our first conclusion is that Equivalence of Frames should be understood
as equivalence with regard to general physical laws, not as identity of actually
occurring motions or as sameness of boundary conditions. In the following we
shall first elaborate on this notion of equivalence and illustrate its application
to pre-relativistic physics and special relativity. We shall then come to the pie`ce
de resistance of our analysis: the question of whether all frames of reference
can be considered equivalent in the general theory of relativity.
2 De facto or de jure
Let us leap from classical mechanics to the early days of special relativity.
From a present-day perspective 3 relativity’s rival was Lorentz’s ether the-
ory, according to which light moves with the constant (i.e., independent of
the velocity of the source) velocity c relative to the ether. Let us suppose,
as is usually done, that the ether is at rest relative to Newtonian absolute
3 In the first years following 1905 the physics community did not perceive Einstein’s
and Lorentz’s theories as clear-cut rivals; see, e.g., Janssen (2002).
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space. According to the ether theory there are differences between the frame
that is stationary with respect to the ether and other inertial frames: in non-
stationary frames there is an ‘ether wind’ that one should expect to influence
physical processes. Notoriously, experiments designed to measure this ether
wind failed. This was part of the background of the genesis of special relativ-
ity: the null results suggested the full equivalence of all inertial frames, also
with regard to optical processes—which was taken as a postulate by Einstein
in 1905.
The main message of this standard quasi-historical account 4 is that in the
ether theory inertial frames were not equivalent, and that this was remedied
by special relativity. But in the light of the discussion in the preceding section
we might query this diagnosis and even doubt its intelligibility. That the ether
is at rest in one frame and moving in others seems prima facie very similar to
the difference between the calm in Galileo’s lake frame and the breeze felt on
the ship. We have placed the latter difference into the category of boundary
conditions, and concluded that there is no reason to doubt the equivalence
of frames because of such factual differences. Is the situation not exactly the
same in the case of the ether theory? That is, is it not true that in some frames
there is an ether wind, as a matter of fact, and in another frame there is no
such wind, without consequence for the equivalence of these frames?
Indeed, the principles of the ether theory can be given a form that is appar-
ently frame-independent in the same way as the principles behind the upward
motion of smoke or insect flight. For example, the ether theory’s light principle
can be put in the form that the velocity of light is c relative to the ether—this
itself is an invariant statement, valid in all frames of reference. More gener-
ally, take the Maxwell equations in their standard form, i.e., the form they
take in the ether frame. Now transform them, by writing them in terms of
the coordinates of an inertial frame that moves with velocity ~v relative to
the ether. The resulting equations, in which the relative velocity of the frame
with respect to the ether occurs explicitly, have a form that can be used in
any inertial frame (if we now treat ~v not as a constant but as a quantity that
is different in different frames). It remains true, of course, that the ether frame
distinguishes itself from other frames because in that frame ~v = 0. But that
seems analogous to the case of Galileo’s lake frame, in which the air velocity
vanished. Therefore, the ‘~v-Maxwell equations’ together with the laws of New-
tonian mechanics appear to provide us with a formulation of the ether theory
that satisfies the principle of relativity: the laws are the same in every inertial
4 As is now well-known, the real history of the genesis of special relativity, the role
of the null-experiments, etc., is much richer and more complicated than suggested by
this ‘physics textbooks account’. We are here interested, however, in the conceptual
question of the meaning of ‘equivalence of frames’ rather than in these historical
issues.
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frame of reference, only the de facto conditions vary.
As already mentioned, at the end of the 19th century it turned out that effects
of motion with respect to the ether could not be measured; differences in values
of ~v proved to be undetectable in optical and electromagnetic experiments.
Lorentz attempted to find an explanation of this, within his ether theory, by
postulating that all forces holding physical systems together change in the
same way as electromagnetic forces when a velocity ~v with respect to the
ether is imparted to these systems. He eventually thus managed to account
for the contraction of moving measuring rods and the slowing down of moving
clocks. These effects compensated other ~v-dependent effects in the following
way: the laws keep their ‘~v = 0 form’ when written down in terms of ‘effective’,
measured coordinates (coordinates determined by means of moving rods and
clocks). In Einstein’s decisive 1905 paper this equivalence of all inertial frames,
also for optical phenomena, was transformed into an equivalence of principle,
and the difference between effective and real coordinates disappeared.
But can we not say on the basis of the above considerations that the theory
of the stationary ether already obeys a full principle of equivalence of all
inertial frames, for mechanical as well as electromagnetic processes, even before
considering Lorentz’s or Einstein’s innovations?
This analysis hinges on the possibility of treating the ether in the same way
as the air in Galileo’s example: we considered the motion of both as fact-like
rather than law-like. It is clear, however, that our tentative verdict that all
inertial frames are fully equivalent in the ether theory, even before Lorentz
and Einstein, is completely at variance with the usual point of view. In the
contemporary discussions around 1900, and also in later foundational investi-
gations, the appearance of a value ~v 6= 0 in the equations was always taken to
signal a lack of equivalence to the ‘fundamental’ frame (the one at rest with
respect to the ether). This suggests the presence of good reasons for doubting
the analogy between the Lorentzian ether and the air surrounding Galileo’s
boat.
Physics texts do not even mention the possibility of regarding ~v 6= 0 frames as
equivalent in the way just explained. Although there is therefore no explicit
discussion of this point, the intuition behind the judgements made in these
and similar cases seems clear enough. The difference between the status of the
air and that of the ether is that it is completely contingent whether the air
is stationary or not in any given frame of reference: such a fact is irrelevant
for the inertiality of the frame and its equivalence to other inertial frames.
Physical theory does not prescribe the wind velocity: this velocity is a matter
of initial and boundary conditions. On the other hand, the state of motion of
the ether cannot be different from what it actually is, according to the theory
of the stationary ether. In all possible universes that are described by the
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equations of the ether theory, the ether possesses the same state of absolute
rest 5 and makes itself felt in exactly the same way in any chosen frame of
reference. There is therefore nothing contingent about the ether wind. The
state of motion of the ether cannot be different from what it actually is. It
is consequently law-like rather than fact-like. That in all possible situations
allowed by the theory the global space-time structure is the same, with the
ether present in the same way, allows an identification of frames of reference,
in the same state of motion, over different models of the theory. In all frames
that rest with respect to the ether, the form of the laws with ~v = 0 applies.
The difference in laws between the frames with ~v = 0 and those with ~v 6= 0
is therefore a nomic feature of the theory rather than a mere difference in
boundary conditions. 6 This spoils the equivalence of these frames.
The idea behind these considerations is general and not restricted to the ether
theory. For example, in the original version of Newtonian mechanics, in which
the notion of rest with respect to absolute space makes sense and is even central
(it occurs in Newton’s first law), not all inertial frames have the same status.
One inertial frame is genuinely at rest, whereas the others are in uniform
motion. These different frames, with their different absolute velocities, are
there in precisely the same way in all possible situations covered by Newtonian
theory. This can be used to identify frames in these different situations (the
velocities provide a criterion of identity of frames across different ‘possible
worlds’—different models or solutions—allowed by the theory). Put differently,
exactly the same frames of reference 7 , characterized by their differing states
5 Defined as rest with respect to absolute space. But one may also view the
ether as something that is not placed in absolute space, but rather replaces it;
as Einstein (1920) phrased it in an early historical survey of his work on relativity
“. . . der ruhende A¨ther, welcher gewissermassen eine Verko¨rperung des von New-
ton eingefu¨hrten absoluten Raumes war” (the resting ether, which in a sense was
a materialization of the absolute space introduced by Newton). Lorentz (1895, p.
4) himself states that it makes no sense to speak of a state of ‘absolute rest’ of
the ether—‘rest’ according to him here only means that there is no relative motion
between the parts of the ether. Lorentz goes on to say that all motions of celestial
bodies should be regarded as defined with respect to the ether, so that it becomes
clear that he has the same picture in mind as Einstein. If the ether fully takes over
the role of absolute space and replaces it, it indeed becomes moot whether one can
say that the ether is at rest—one can likewise question the meaningfulness of the
notion of rest if applied to absolute space itself. For the subject under discussion
here—the equivalence of reference frames—this question is not important. Even if
absolute space is abolished, the ether remains the fixed standard with respect to
which absolute velocities are defined.
6 We use the defining characteristic that laws are the same in all models of a theory,
whereas facts vary from one model to another.
7 The notion of ‘frame’ is here meant in an abstract sense, as a congruence of
worldlines in space-time, which do not have to be materially realized by moving
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of motion, are present in all models of the theory. This is not a matter of
contingency but reflects a law-like feature of the theory. However, the case
of Newtonian theory is atypical in that these differences do not correspond
to different values of parameters occurring in the physical laws, as they did
in the ether theory (~v does not appear in the equations, unlike the case of
the ether theory). Newton’s law-like differences between inertial frames are
undetectable. This raises the suspicion that the differences in question are
not needed for the formulation of an adequate dynamics. This suspicion is
borne out: classical mechanics can be formulated without making use of the
Newtonian notion of absolute rest. For the purpose of mechanics it is sufficient
to distinguish between inertial and accelerated motion, and this can be done
within a weaker space-time framework than that of Newton’s theory: we do
not need a notion of identity of spatial points over time. The resulting weaker
structure is known as neo-Newtonian spacetime (e.g., Earman, 1989, Chapter
2.4). Against this new spatio-temporal background different states of uniform
motion can no longer be used to identify inertial frames across models of the
theory. It remains true, of course, that in any model of the theory inertial
frames of reference move uniformly with respect to each other, but there is
no way to use these uniform velocities to identify frames in different models
of the theory. Remember that such an identification across models could be
achieved in the original Newtonian version of the theory through the different
relations of the various frames to the constant space-time background, which
is present in all possible situations governed by the theory. Since velocity
with respect to neo-Newtonian space is not definable, the new version of the
theory no longer has the conceptual resources to establish this rigid reference
connection between inertial frames in different models.
Consequently, in neo-Newtonian spacetime there are no longer law-like differ-
ences between inertial frames. They all become fully equivalent. But accelera-
tion still is a well-defined property of frames of reference, since neo-Newtonian
spacetime is equipped with a notion of four-dimensional straightness. What
was true for absolute velocities in the original theory now applies to acceler-
ations (i.e., lack of straightness of worldlines). There is a law-like difference
between accelerated and non-accelerated frames; and this difference cannot be
dealt with as something that is merely contingent.
To be more accurate we should point out that the identification across mod-
els is not always in terms of individual frames, but may pertain to classes of
frames possessing the same defining characteristics. Thus, in the neo-Newtonian
case the value of the acceleration only picks out a class of accelerated frames,
which are in uniform motion with respect to each other.
In summary, both in the case of the ether theory and that of Newtonian
systems.
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classical mechanics there are nomological, law-like, differences between frames.
A natural way of capturing these differences is to say that the different frames
are present in the same way in all solutions allowed by the equations of the
theory; that all models of the theory contain them in the same way. To take
the ether as an example: the ether has the same properties in all possible
worlds (as defined by the theory) and serves as a fixed skeleton with respect
to which frames can be defined. This provides a natural criterion of identity
of frames across models.
3 Law-like features, rigid reference and absolute objects
The a priori fixed character of the ether and Newtonian space-time structure
can alternatively be expressed by saying that these constitute ‘absolute ob-
jects’, in the sense of Anderson (1967, pp. 83-87). Anderson defined absolute
objects as spatio-temporal features that affect physical processes, but are not
themselves affected by anything. He used these ‘objects’ to define the symme-
try group of the theory: this is the group of space-time transformations that
leave the theory’s absolute objects invariant. In Lorentz’s theory the ether is
absolute and the symmetry group is the group of translations and rotations,
since these leave the ether the same (there are no preferred points or direc-
tions in the ether). The fundamental frame, i.e., the frame at rest with respect
to the ether, is invariant under the transformations of this symmetry group.
More generally, frames from one equivalence class of frames are transformed
into each other by elements of the theory’s symmetry group.
The result of Anderson’s analysis with regard to the question of which frames
are equivalent in classical mechanics and special relativity, and which transfor-
mations connect these frames, is the same as what we argued for in connection
with law-like equivalence above. However, Anderson introduced his absolute
objects by contrasting them with ‘dynamic objects’, which he defined as enti-
ties whose state parameters occur in a variational principle associated with the
equations of motion. From a conceptual point of view it is unclear, however,
why such a connection with the form of the dynamics should be central to the
analysis of physical equivalence of frames of reference. Indeed, it may very well
be and must even be expected that objects like the structure of neo-Newtonian
space-time and the gµν of special relativity can be given a dynamical status: all
one has to do is to formulate variational principles that invariably have these
structures as their solutions (Maidens, 1998). By focusing on sameness across
models and linking this to the distinction between law-like and fact-like fea-
tures of reference systems, as we are doing here, the relevance of ‘absoluteness’
for the equivalence of frames does become perspicuous. Since the absolute ob-
jects occur in each and every model of the theory, they can serve to connect
frames that occur in different models: (classes of) frames that possess the same
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relations to the absolute structure can be identified.
The absolute objects thus serve as the fixed background with respect to which
identity across models is defined. The fixed background itself occurs in the
same way in all models of the theory. One may wonder how this ‘sameness’
should be characterized mathematically, since the precise form of a technical
criterion for the identity of geometric objects across models is a debated sub-
ject in the literature (Friedman, 1983; Torretti, 1984; Maidens, 1998). For our
purposes here we do not need to give a definitive general answer to this ques-
tion, though. It is enough for us to specify what the absolute objects are in the
theories we are considering: (neo-)Newtonian space-time structure in classical
mechanics and the Minkowski metric in special relativity. These space-time
structures are the nomic backbones in all models of these theories. There is
no similar invariable space-time structure in general relativity.
The problem of how to formulate completely general identity criteria across
models that can pick out fixed structure in all imaginable space-time theories
need therefore not immediately concern us. For our purposes and the theories
we are discussing the criterion of diffeomorphic equivalence proposed by Fried-
man (1983) seems satisfactory. In the ‘coordinate language’ that was common
until coordinate-free formulations of space-time theories became dominant, a
couple of decades ago, two models are diffeomorphically equivalent if a co-
ordinate transformation in one model is possible that makes its coordinate
description identical to that of the other model. Space-time structure is abso-
lute if it can be given the exact same appearance in all models of the theory
through suitable choices of coordinates. For example, the Minkowski inertial
structure is absolute in special relativity because a choice of coordinates is
possible in each model in terms of which gµν = (−1, 1, 1, 1) everywhere.
It has been questioned whether this criterion of diffeomorphic equivalence ad-
equately captures the notion of absolute structure in general. For example,
Torretti (1984, p. 285) argues that an imaginary theory that would postu-
late that space-time has a certain constant and non-dynamical curvature, but
remains silent about the concrete value of this curvature, possesses models
with different curvatures. Such models are not diffeomeorphically equivalent
(because curvature is invariant under diffeomorphisms). The curvature would
therefore not qualify as an absolute object here, in conflict with intuition.
However, this consequence disappears as soon as we reformulate this theory
in a way that brings it closer to actually existing theories. The case described
by Torretti would ordinarily be regarded as a case in which we are ignorant
about the exact form of the theory we should use: there are different possi-
bilities, each with its own class of models (characterized by one value of the
curvature). In each one of these theories curvature does qualify as an absolute
object—on the basis of the criterion of diffeomorphic equivalence—so that the
conclusion would become that curvature is absolute, whatever the form of the
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right theory is. On another interpretation of Torretti’s example (not meant by
its author) the theory would describe a collection of possible universes, each
with its own curvature. In this case curvature would fail to qualify as absolute
but this would not seem to conflict with intuition, because curvature really
is a non-constant feature of the theory. Another objection, which is more di-
rectly relevant from this paper’s viewpoint because it concerns GR, is the one
put forward by Geroch—as reported by Friedman (1983, p. 59). It relies on
the fact that any two everywhere non-vanishing time-like vector fields are dif-
feomorphically equivalent (because their integral curves can be mapped onto
each other by a diffeomorphism). So in cosmological models in which there
is omnipresent dust, the associated velocity fields would qualify as absolute
objects. However, this conclusion does not have repercussions for GR as such:
the set of all models of GR certainly contains models in which there is no
dust in finite space-time regions, so the diffeomorphism criterion deems dust
velocity fields to be not absolute in the actual GR.
To restrict oneself to a smaller class of models, in all of which the universe
is completely full of dust, means changing the theory. It is true that the new
theory that comes into being when only such dust-filled universes are admitted
does treat the dust velocity field as absolute. This does not conflict with
expectations: in all worlds allowed by this new theory there is a congruence
of dust worldlines that can serve as a background to fix time-like coordinate
axes. There would be an absolute frame in this imaginary theory: the rest-
frame of the dust. It would consequently be possible to systematically identify
(classes of) other frames through their states of motion with respect to this
dust frame. It is thinkable that the theory could be such that there is an
associated systematic variation in the parameters occurring in the laws as
they apply to these frames (e.g., this could be due to interaction with the
dust, assuming it is the same kind of dust that occurs in all models). In this
case there would be nomic differences between frames—as far as I can see
this is not in conflict with what intuition tells us about such dust worlds. It
would be interesting to see whether there are other cases in which the criterion
of diffeomorphic equivalence does give rise to unacceptable results about the
equivalence of frames.
In summary, fixed or ‘absolute’ structure yields the possibility of identifying
features across models of the theory. It thus becomes part of the theory’s
nomic structure. Differences between frames that are due to different relations
these frames bear to the fixed backdrop are to be considered law-like rather
than fact-like. In particular, if the laws of motion in these frames contain
quantities that characterize the different absolute motions of these frames (like
position, velocity or acceleration with respect to the fixed background), these
laws are to be regarded as different. By contrast, if only contingent boundary
or initial conditions vary, the frames in question are equivalent. This analysis
of equivalence of frames is in accordance with the way these notions are usually
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employed both in pre-relativistic physics and in special relativity.
4 Special relativity
In special relativity there is no ether or absolute space. Still, there is a fixed
spatio-temporal geometric structure, similar to that of neo-Newtonian space-
time, namely Minkowski space-time. Possible worlds according to special rel-
ativity are specifications of particle and field configurations within identical
copies of Minkowski space-time. Inertial frames are defined by congruences
of time-like geodesics in this absolute space-time structure. In coordinates
adapted to these frames we have gµν = (−1, 1, 1, 1).
We could now follow the recipe of sec. 2 and subject these laws to arbitrary
coordinate transformations. In this way we can obtain a generalized form of the
laws, valid in coordinates adapted to any frame of reference. This maneuver
was famously proposed by Kretschmann (1917, p. 579). Kretschmann started
from the standard form of the special relativistic law of light propagation,
4x2 −4t2 = 0. Writing this in ‘generally covariant form’ he obtained
δ
∫
ds = 0,
ds2 = 0, (1)
Rλµντ = 0.
The last of these equations states that the Riemann tensor vanishes identically.
The same thing can be done for inertial particle motion, which leads to
δ
∫
ds = 0,
Rλµντ = 0. (2)
The vanishing of the Riemann tensor ensures the flatness of space-time (a
stipulation about the topology should be added to make sure that we are in
global Minkowski space-time). Although the sets of eqs. (1) and (2) look the
same in any coordinate system, they are equivalent with the original equations.
And obviously, the differences between inertial and accelerated frames cannot
change as a result of this mere rewriting procedure.
The way in which these differences are represented in the equations becomes
clear when we work out eqs. (1) and (2). For the case of particle motion we
11
obtain
d2xi
ds2
= Γijk
dxj
ds
dxk
ds
, (3)
where Γijk ≡ gil (glj,k + glk,j − gjk,l) are the so-called Christoffel symbols (with
gij the coefficients of the line element ds
2 = gijdx
idxj in arbitary coordinates
and commas denoting differentiation). Eq. (3) generalizes the inertial motion
equation d2xi/dt2 = 0. It applies both to inertial and accelerated systems.
But despite this form invariance there is no equivalence of frames. Indeed, by
virtue of the last formula in both Equation (1) and (2) (plus a stipulation about
the topology) the space-time always contains a set of global inertial frames
and incorporates a notion of absolute acceleration. The numerical values of
the coefficients Γijk that occur in the ‘generally valid form’ of the equation of
motion have therefore the same status as the ~v of sec. 2: they are quantities
that encode the acceleration of the frame that is used—the (possibly variable)
deviation of straightness of the worldlines of the congruence that defines the
frame. These numbers identify the class of equivalent frames to which our
frame belongs, in a way that is the same in all models of the theory. Applying
the ideas of the preceding sections, we conclude that the mere sameness of
form of the eqs. (3) in all frames of reference does not entail the equivalence of
these frames. Accelerated frames are nomically different from inertial frames:
the differences are codified in the values of the Γijk.
5 Gravitation
The symmetry between inertial frames and non-inertial frames in special rel-
ativity is thus broken by the law-like status of the difference between ‘iner-
tiality’ and ‘non-inertiality’. It is true that the equations can be written in
such a way that they have the same appearance in every frame of reference,
but this does nothing to remove the rigid reference that is made, in these
same equations, to the class of frames in which they apply. There is therefore
no general equivalence of frames in special relativity. Rewriting the theory in
generally-covariant form does nothing to change this.
Consequently, in order to achieve the equivalence of all frames we should see
to it that there no longer is a fixed background with respect to which classes
of frames can be identified across different models of the theory. The charac-
teristics of the motions as described within a frame, or the values assumed by
Γijk, should not be usable as address labels with the help of which classes of
frames can be located with respect to a fixed structure that is the same in
all models of the theory. (As we have seen, in special relativity this is possi-
ble, because the Γijk—once we know in which way the coordinates have been
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assigned—contain information about the linear acceleration and rotation of
the considered frame.)
The way to accomplish this is to make sure that the structure that is fixed in
all solutions of the theory is weakened, so that the values of Γijk can no longer
function as address labels. The transition from Newtonian space-time to neo-
Newtonian space-time affords an example of such a weakening of space-time
structure. In Newtonian space-time different velocities relative to absolute
space distinguish between inertial frames, but in neo-Newtonian space-time it
is no longer possible to define such different velocities. This results in the full
equivalence of all inertial systems. If we could make a similar move in relativity
theory, by weakening Minkowski structure in such a way that acceleration is
no longer definable on the basis of the fixed background structure, this would
solve our problem.
However, there is a decisive point on which the situation in special relativity
deviates from that in Newtonian mechanics: absolute acceleration in special
relativity is an observable quantity (as it is in classical mechanics), whereas
absolute velocity in Newtonian theory is notoriously unobservable. Because of
the latter fact, the transition from Newtonian to neo-Newtonian space-time
is possible without observational consequences. Such an effortless change is
not in the cards in the case of relativity theory. The requirement that inertial
forces do not provide a rigid reference to classes of frames must involve going
over to a theory that treats these forces as contingent, i.e., depending on initial
and boundary conditions.
It is here that Einstein’s principle of equivalence enters. This principle offers
prospects of replacing absolute acceleration with a quantity that is compara-
ble to gravitational acceleration in Newton’s theory, conditioned by contingent
factors like the distribution of masses. We can thus hope to treat the phenom-
ena that testify to the non-inertial character of frames—e.g., the occurrence of
Coriolis and centrifugal forces—as contingently occurring phenomena that do
not count against the equivalence of these frames with inertial ones. The oc-
currence of inertial forces could be like the appearance of a breeze in Galileo’s
cabin with open windows; or like the appearance of magnetic forces in frames
that move with respect to electrical charges. To elaborate on the latter exam-
ple: a special relativistic rest frame in which there are only Coulomb forces
might be said to be privileged in a de facto sense. But since the same Maxwell
equations hold in all inertial frames in special relativity, without any differ-
ences in the numerical values of the constants occurring in them, the differ-
ences between the electrical forces in the various frames are completely due
to differences in initial and boundary conditions. Accordingly, in special rel-
ativistic electrodynamics such differences are never interpreted as signifying
fundamental distinctions in the status of frames of reference.
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That a similar account of inertiality is possible is suggested by Einstein’s
equivalence principle. This principle states that being in a frame that accel-
erates with respect to a (special relativistic) inertial frame and being in an
inertial system in which there is a homogeneous gravitational field are equiva-
lent situations: the difference is one of description. This hints at a dynamical
explanation of the difference between inertiality and non-inertiality: the dis-
tinction may be similar to the distinction between frames without and with
a non-static electromagnetic field—but now gravitation instead of electricity
and magnetism will have to do the job. 8
Obviously, this idea can succeed only if the gravitational field is a dynamic en-
tity, subject to a field equation. Nothing would be gained if ‘gravitational field’
would be just a label for referring to an a priori given space-time structure.
The latter might be suggested by Einstein’s original form of the equivalence
principle, according to which a homogeneous gravitational field (actually, not a
solution of the Newtonian gravitational equation with non-vanishing sources)
is indistinguishable from a uniform acceleration field. We have to look for
a dynamic theory of gravitation. Newtonian gravitational theory affords the
natural starting point: it supplies us with an equation that determines a grav-
itational field given sources and boundary conditions (as described from a
given inertial frame of reference). If this gravitational field does not vanish,
this can in the light of the equivalence principle be taken to mean that we are
in a frame that is accelerated, while the acceleration has the status of some-
thing contingent, depending on the distribution of material sources. If such
a strategy works out, the presence of an acceleration field, or inertial forces,
will no longer be a reason to think a frame is fundamentally different from a
frame without such effects.
8 Janssen (2005, 64) points out the crucial importance, also in Einstein’s actual
thinking, of this analogy between the treatment of electrical and magnetic fields in
special relativity on the one hand and that of inertial and gravitational fields in
general relativity on the other. He concludes that with GR Einstein achieved a ‘rel-
ativity of the inertial-gravitational field’ but not the relativity of arbitrary motion
(because frames that accelerate with respect to each other are clearly physically
distinguishable; being in a rapidly spinning spacecraft feels very different from be-
ing in free fall). The analysis of the present paper dovetails very nicely with this
conclusion. We add that it is this relativity of the inertial-gravitational field (itself a
consequence of the form invariance of the laws of nature) and not relativity of motion
that is the essential criterion for judging whether or not frames are equivalent.
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6 General relativity
The principle of equivalence was one of the heuristic stepping stones in the
genesis of general relativity. However, the final theory does not always agree
with the ideas that guided its formation. One point is that although general
relativity is certainly a theory of gravitation, the notion of a gravitational
force and a gravitational field do not appear in the theory—at least not in
the form in which they occur in Newton’s theory of gravitation. Gravitation
has become geometrized: the field equations determine the metric field gµν(x),
which in turn encodes all gravitational effects.
This does not constitute an obstacle, however, for carrying through the pro-
gram sketched in sec. 5. We can define coordinate systems in which gµν =
(−1, 1, 1, 1) as being adapted to inertial systems; frames whose adapted co-
ordinates do not lead to these gµν values are by definition non-inertial. This
definition translates the special relativistic notion of inertial system into the
framework of general relativity. It entails that in general inertial systems are
only defined locally.
The situation is now the one envisioned in sec. 5. We solve the Einstein equa-
tions, given the mass-energy distribution in the universe plus boundary con-
ditions, in terms of an arbitrary coordinate system; by coordinate transforma-
tions we then establish what the local inertial system are. Systems that accel-
erate with respect to these local inertial frames are non-inertial. The physical
differences between the inertial and non-inertial systems are of course still
what they were before: in non-inertial frames there are Coriolis, centrifugal
and similar effects. But these differences have now become the result of con-
tingent factors. The boundary and initial conditions with which the Einstein
equations have to be combined decide the patchwork pattern of local inertial
frames. It is not determined a priori which frames will be inertial and which
ones will not. There is no fixed structure that can serve to identify frames
across all models of the theory: the differences in frames are contingent rather
than law-like. In Galileo’s example, the rest frame of the lake (in which the
air was stationary) was physically different from other frames, but that did
not imply a fundamental difference in status. In the same way here, the local
inertial frame is different from non-inertial frames without a violation of the
fundamental law-like equivalence of these frames.
7 Covariance, symmetry and relativity
One of the main ideas behind calling the relativistic theory of gravitation
general relativity was the idea that the new theory generalizes the relativity
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principle of the special theory. Einstein saw this generalization realized in
his principle of general covariance, according to which the laws should take
the same form in all coordinate systems. He claimed that this principle was
satisfied in GR but not in SR, so that we have a genuine generalization here.
There is, however, a long tradition in which Einstein’s view is criticized, start-
ing with the already mentioned paper by Kretschmann (Kretschmann, 1917).
Kretschmann argued that the requirement of general covariance is physically
vacuous and therefore unconnected to any relativity principle. A popular mod-
ern version of this line of criticism maintains that Einstein confused covariance
and space-time symmetry (Friedman, 1983). 9 The argument is that the form
invariance of the laws, required by the principle of general covariance, can
always be achieved by choosing clever mathematical formulations of the laws.
We have seen the correctness of this claim in secs. 2 and 4. The requirement
of general covariance does therefore not impose any restrictions on space-time
theories. By contrast, the argument continues, what is at stake in a relativity
principle is the invariance of gµν in the transition from one reference frame to
an equivalent one. In other words, equivalent frames are connected by trans-
formations from the space-time symmetry group. There can thus only be a
non-trivial relativity principle in theories in which the space-time exhibits
symmetries. But in GR the symmetry group of 〈M, gµν〉 is the identity group,
because there is no fixed space-time structure common to all models of the
theory. This then would show that there is no general relativity and no general
equivalence of frames in GR at all.
The idea behind this linking of a relativity principle to symmetries of the
space-time would seem to be that the spatio-temporal background should
look the same from equivalent frames. This can be justified to the extent
that in this case the choice of the same initial and boundary conditions will
lead to the same solutions of the equations of motion in the different frames.
However, space-time itself is left out of consideration in the specification of the
boundary conditions, which shows that this conception of ‘relativity’ is tailored
to theories in which space-time structure is a priori rather than subject to
dynamical laws. The analysis proposed in this paper extends this notion of
relativity to the more general case in which space-time itself may be dynamical.
We have therefore insisted on the difference between laws and contingent,
factual, conditions in a quite general way, which includes the case of laws
governing the space-time structure. These general laws should be the same in
equivalent frames. As we explained, this entails that the laws in different but
equivalent frames should not contain different references to a fixed background
structure. In the case of special relativity this leads to the conclusion that only
frames connected by Lorentz transformations are equivalent. But in GR the
differences between all frames can be said to be purely factual.
9 See (Norton, 1995) for a review of the discussion.
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So Kretschmann was right in that laws can always be given the same form,
in the syntactic sense of being given by the exact same string of symbols, and
that this does not guarantee the equivalence of frames. The essential question,
however, is not about this syntactic form invariance, but about whether there
are law-like differences between frames. As illustrated by the equations involv-
ing ~v in sec. 2, we can have expressions that have the same syntactical form
and yet do not represent the same law because of semantic considerations. If
we interpret the principle of general covariance as the requirement that the
same laws hold in all coordinate systems, i.e. without quantities entering into
the expressions that locate the system with respect to a fixed space-time back-
ground, there is a relation with the equivalence of frames. In a general principle
of relativity we have to restrict the class of admissible laws to those not con-
taining reference to a fixed space-time background. This is very close to the
suggestions made by Weyl (1918, secs. 26, 27) and Pauli (1921, sec. 52). The
difference is in the conceptual justification: Weyl and Pauli start by imposing
the general requirement that laws should only contain “physical state quan-
tities, to which something real corresponds” (physikalische Zustandsgro¨ßen,
denen etwas Reales entspricht), and in this way attempt to block the intro-
duction of mathematical devices that ‘artificially’ give the laws the same form
in every frame. By this strategy they achieve that in Newtonian mechanics and
special relativity not all frames become equivalent, in spite of the possibility
of a covariant formulation of the laws. For example, in special relativity the
quantities Γijk (see sec. 4) occur in the generally covariant equations; but these
quantities are not subject to a dynamical law and therefore not physically
meaningful, according to Weyl and Pauli. By contrast, in general relativity
the Γijk are determined by the dynamical Einstein equations.
The problem with this proposal, however, is that the connection between
‘physically real’ and ‘non-dynamical’ is completely unclear. Why should the
Γijk from sec. 4 not be physically significant (compare Norton, 1995, pp. 232-
233)? The space-time structures of classical mechanics and special relativity
are certainly meant to correspond to things that are physically very real and
significant. That the laws should not contain non-dynamic quantities of the
type we have discussed can therefore not be derived from the requirement that
only physically significant or real quantities should occur in them.
In terms of its final conclusions the analysis defended here comes close to pro-
posals made earlier in the literature. Only the connection with the distinction
between law-like and fact-like features, however, makes the idea cogent from a
conceptual point of view. General covariance in the sense given here is satisfied
in GR, and guarantees the equivalence of all frames of reference in this theory.
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8 Einstein
The conclusion of the preceding sections suggests that Einstein was right after
all: that general covariance does imply general equivalence of frames and that
GR is a direct generalization of SR. This verdict depends, evidently, on the
interpretation given here to the notions of general covariance and equivalence
of frames. Can this analysis be seen as a fair gloss of Einstein’s own pronounce-
ments on these issues and thereby furnish a justification of his position?
A straightforward answer to this question is made difficult by the fact that
there are several intertwined strands discernible in Einstein’s early thinking
about general covariance and relativity. I do think that essential elements of
the approach defended here constituted one of these strands. But there were
also considerations relating to a general empiricist stance in the philosophy
of science, to Mach’s principle and the relational character of motion a` la
Leibniz that played a role, especially in the early period of Einstein’s work on
general relativity (1907-1918). 10 I believe, however, that ideas in the spirit of
what we have discussed here remained important for Einstein during his whole
life, whereas the themes of empiricism, Mach’s principle and the relativity of
motion gradually faded away.
In sec. 5 we already commented on the part played by the analogy between
electromagnetism and gravitation, via the principle of equivalence. As Ein-
stein (1920, p. 265) stressed in his early historical comments on the genesis
of general relativity, this analogy alerted him to the possibility of seeing the
occurrence of inertial effects as something of the same status as the occur-
rence of an electric field in a frame in which a magnet moves. He concludes
in this document that there is no essential difference between an accelerating
and an inertial frame—the differences are fact-like, in our terminology—so
that all frames can be considered as equivalent. In his review article of the
just-finished theory, Einstein (1916) introduced his subject by pointing out a
serious defect in special relativity: this theory defines the difference between
inertial and non-inertial frames through their different relations to absolute
space. He then stressed that the only satisfactory approach would be one in
which the differences in question would be related to differing situations of
the frames with respect to physical things, such as distant masses, while the
general laws of motion would remain the same in all frames. This clearly is
in the spirit of the idea elaborated here (although we would allow bound-
ary conditions for the metric field alongside distant matter). Einstein kept
stressing this relation between equivalence and sameness of the laws during
his whole career (Norton, 1995, p. 238). In his Autobiographical Notes (Schilp,
1949, p. 66) Einstein wrote with approving hindsight about his thoughts in
10 Cf. Janssen (2005) for the confusing role played by Mach’s principle.
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1908 (with slight changes in Schilp’s translation in order to make the rendition
more literal):
“So, if one regards as possible gravitational fields of arbitrary extension, not
a priori restricted by spatial boundary conditions, then the concept ‘inertial
system’ becomes completely empty. The concept ‘acceleration with respect
to space’ then loses all meaning and with it the principle of inertia together
with Mach’s paradox. Thus, the fact of the equality of inert and heavy
mass leads quite naturally to the conception that the basic requirement
of the special theory of relativity (invariance of the laws under Lorentz
transformations) is too narrow, i.e., that one has to postulate invariance of
the laws also with respect to non-linear transformations of the coordinates
in the four-dimensional continuum.” 11
The ideas of rejection of absolute space as a fixed structure, its replacement
by a dynamical mechanism (gravitation) and the relation of this to form in-
variance of the laws are all clearly present here. In the second appendix of the
last edition of ‘The Meaning of Relativity’ (Einstein, 1956, p. 139-140) we find
something very similar:
“It is the essential achievement of the general theory of relativity that it
has freed physics from the necessity of introducing the ‘inertial system’ (or
inertial systems). This concept is unsatisfactory for the following reason:
without any deeper foundation it singles out certain coordinate systems
among all conceivable ones. It is then assumed that the laws of physics
hold only for such inertial systems (e.g. the law of inertia and the law of
the constancy of the velocity of light). Thereby, space as such is assigned
a role in the system of physics that distinguishes it from all other elements
of physical description. It plays a role in all processes, without in its turn
being influenced by them.”
Einstein (1956, p. 141) then goes on to discuss the improvement introduced
by general relativity, by comparing it with Gauss’s theory of curved surfaces:
“Since, in general, there exists no preferred coordinate system on a surface,
11 “Wenn man also beliebig ausgedehnte, nicht von vornherein durch ra¨umliche
Grenzbedingungen eingeschra¨nkte, Gravitationsfelder als mo¨glich betrachtet, so
wird der Begriff des Inertialsystems vo¨llig leer. Der Begriff ‘Beschleunigung
gegenu¨ber dem Raume’ verliert dann jede Bedeutung und damit auch das
Tra¨gheitsprinzip samt demMach’schen Paradoxon. So fu¨hrt die Tatsache der Gleich-
heit der tra¨gen und schweren Masse ganz natu¨rlich zu den Auffassungen, dass
die Grund-Forderungen der speziellen Relativita¨tstheorie (Invarianz der Gesetze
bezu¨glich Lorentz-Transformationen) zu eng sei, d.h. dass man eine Invarianz der
Gesetze auch bezu¨glich nicht linearer Transformationen der Koordinaten im vierdi-
mensionalen Kontinuum zu postulieren habe.”
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this investigation led for the first time to expressing the relevant quantities
in general coordinates. Riemann has extended this two-dimensional theory
of surfaces to spaces of an arbitrary number of dimensions . . . ”
In any particular surface there clearly may be preferred coordinates, adapted
to the spatial structure of that surface. Evidently, what Einstein wants to
express is that if we consider all possible surfaces, there is no common fixed
metric skeleton, to which we could adapt coordinate systems by means of a
general recipe. In other words, within the set of all curved surfaces there is
no a priori fixed structure that could serve to relate coordinate systems on
different surfaces. All coordinate systems get therefore equal a priori rights.
It is the analogous feature in four dimensions that, in the transition from
special to general relativity, removes the special status of inertial systems and
guarantees the general validity of the laws of physics. This is the same thought
as the one underlying the proposal of this paper.
However, in his reply to Kretschmann Einstein (1918) notoriously chose a
different strategy. He admitted that Kretschmann was right in his claim that
general covariance was more a matter of mathematical ingenuity in writing
down the equations than of physical content. Nevertheless, he emphasized the
heuristic value of general covariance if combined with a principle of simplicity.
So it may seem that at this crucial moment Einstein was following an analysis
of general covariance that is at variance with the one proposed here. Worse,
it appears that his reliance on simplicity is hardly a move that can be taken
seriously: there are no general arguments that show that simplicity improves a
theory’s chances of being true, and the notion of simplicity itself is notoriously
shaky.
On the other hand, the obviousness of such general objections to the value
of the notion of simplicity makes one wonder what concrete ‘simple’ features
Einstein had in mind. The example Einstein (1918) gives is that of Newto-
nian theory versus general relativity: he claims that from the point of view of
the absolute differential calculus Newton’s theory is forbiddingly complicated.
As Norton (1995) points out, this example is unfortunate. Indeed, it would
not take long before four-dimensional formulations of Newtonian theory that
did not look terribly complicated appeared on the stage. On the other hand,
it is plausible that Einstein’s expectation that such a theory would be very
troublesome was based on his conviction that the fixed space-time structure
of Newtonian theory, consisting of separate spatial and temporal parts as it
does, would resist the kind of elegant simple covariant formulation general
relativity is capable of. In other words, it may well be that Einstein’s appeal
to simplicity was an expression of his intuition that a correct theory should
be able to do without the complication of a fixed space-time background:
less a priori structure certainly adds to the simplicity of a theory, from one
point of view. This interpretation receives support from what Einstein writes
20
about this issue in his Autobiographical Notes (Schilp, 1949, pp. 68,69). 12 Af-
ter conceding again that a mere rewriting of expressions can make them look
generally covariant, he stresses the great heuristic significance of searching for
equations that in their generally covariant formulation are as simple as possi-
ble. He adds that if this simplicity is achieved, fields that can be transformed
into each other by the allowed general transformations will describe the same
real state of affairs. The idea apparently is that in this case only mutual re-
lations between the dynamical fields are important in the specification of the
physical state of affairs. The absence in physical reality of rigid background
structure that would not remain invariant under all transformations seems the
basic intuition behind all these considerations.
In his reply to Kretschmann, Einstein (1918) expressed the same thought by
his ‘point-coincidence principle’: the laws of nature merely express spatio-
temporal coincidences. This principle already occurred in the 1916 review
paper as an argument for general covariance. But in the 1918 paper, Einstein
emphasized the need to distinguish the relativity principle from Mach’s prin-
ciple and the relational character of motion, stating that he had not been
clear on this issue before. He now stated that the point-coincidence principle
captured the exact content of the relativity principle, and claimed that this
principle has the consequence that the only natural form of the laws must be
generally covariant. The way I read this is that the point-coincidence princi-
ple contains the tacit assumption that it is only ‘physical things’ (particles
and fields—and not a priori determined objects) and their coincidences that
play a role in the specification of the state of the universe and in the laws of
nature. The point-by-point coincidences between these dynamical objects con-
tain everything there is to know about the world. Fixed space-time structure
is assumed to be absent. 13 After this paper (Einstein, 1918), Mach’s princi-
ple and the relativity of motion gradually lost their significance in Einstein’s
theorizing. But that is a different story, with its own complications.
Arguments along these lines suggest broad agreement between Einstein’s own
position and what is proposed in this paper. But I do not want to press the
point. It is sufficient for my purposes here if the analysis of general covari-
ance and equivalence of frames presented here can stand on its own two feet,
regardless of whether Einstein had something similar in mind.
12 Einstein’s later recollections concerning his trajectory to GR should be handled
with care. See, e.g., van Dongen (2002) and Janssen and Renn (forthcoming). How-
ever, as far as the notions of covariance and equivalence of frames are concerned
there is a remarkable consistency in Einstein’s writings, at least regarding the as-
pects dealt with in this paper.
13 For this reason, the point-coincidence principle guarantees that the diffeomorphi-
cally related cosmological models discussed in the hole argument satisfy the same
laws.
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